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A pseudo-random function is a fundamental cryptographic primitive that is
essential for encryption, identification, and authentication. We present a new
cryptographic primitive called pseudo-random synthesizer and show how to
use it in order to get a parallel construction of a pseudo-random function. We
show several NC 1 implementations of synthesizers based on concrete intrac-
tability assumptions as factoring and the DiffieHellman assumption. This
yields the first parallel pseudo-random functions (based on standard intrac-
tability assumptions) and the only alternative to the original construction of
Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali. In addition, we show parallel construc-
tions of synthesizers based on other primitives such as weak pseudo-random
functions or trapdoor one-way permutations. The security of all our con-
structions is similar to the security of the underlying assumptions. The
connection with problems in computational learning theory is discussed.
 1999 Academic Press
1. INTRODUCTION
A pseudo-random function, as defined by Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali
[26], is a function that is indistinguishable from a truly random function to a
(polynomial-time bounded) observer who can access the function as a black-box
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(i.e., can provide inputs of his choice and gets to see the value of the function on
these inputs). Pseudo-random functions are the key component of private-key cryp-
tography. They allow parties who share a common key to send secret messages to
each other, to identify themselves and to authenticate messages [16, 27, 40]. In
addition, they have many other applications, essentially in any setting that calls for
a random function that is provided as a black-box [9, 12, 19, 23, 24, 41, 51].
Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali provided a construction of such functions.
For roughly a decade, this was the only known construction even under specific
assumptions such as ‘‘factoring is hard.’’ Their construction is sequential in nature
and consists of n successive invocations of a pseudo-random generator (where n is
the number of bits in the input to the function). Our goal in this paper is to present
an alternative construction for pseudo-random functions that can be implemented
in log n phases.
We introduce a new cryptographic primitive which we call a pseudo-random
synthesizer. A pseudo-random synthesizer is a two-variable function, S( } , } ), so that
if many (but polynomially bounded) random assignments, (x1 , ..., xm) and
( y1 , ..., ym) , are chosen for both variables, then the output of S on all the combi-
nations of these assignments, ( f (xi , yj))mi, j=1 , is indistinguishable from a random
one to a polynomial-time observer. Our main results are:
1. A construction of pseudo-random functions based on pseudo-random
synthesizers. Evaluating such a function involves log n phases, where each phase
consists of several parallel invocations of a synthesizer (with a total of n invocations
altogether).
2. Constructions of parallel (NC 1) synthesizers based on standard number-
theoretic assumptions such as ‘‘factoring is hard,’’ RSA (it is hard to extract roots
modulo a composite), and DiffieHellman; in addition, a very simple construction
based on a problem from learning. The key-generating algorithm of these construc-
tions is sequential for RSA and factoring, nonuniformly parallel for DiffieHellman,
and parallel for the learning problem.
3. An extremely simple (and also parallel) construction of synthesizers based
on what we call a weak pseudo-random function. A weak pseudo-random function
is indistinguishable from a truly random function to a (polynomial-time bounded)
observer who gets to see the value of the function on uniformly distributed inputs
(instead of any input of its choice). This construction almost immediately implies
constructions of synthesizers based on trapdoor one-way permutations and based
on any hard-to-learn problem (under the definition of [13]).
Taking (1) and (2) together we get a pseudo-random function that can be evaluated
in NC2.
We note that our constructions do not weaken the security of the underlying
assumptions. Take for instance the construction that is based on factoring. If there
is an algorithm for breaking this construction in time t and success : (success :
means that the observer has an advantage of at least : in distinguishing the
pseudo-random function from the random one), then there is an algorithm that
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works in time poly(t) and factors Blum-integers with probability :poly(t). See
[32, 40] for a discussion of security-preserving reductions.1
Our constructions of pseudo-random functions have additional attractive properties.
First, it is possible to obtain from the constructions a sharp timespace trade-off.
Loosely speaking, by keeping m strings as the key we can reduce the amount of work
for computing the functions from n invocations of the synthesizer to about nlog m
invocations in log n&log log m phases (thus, also reducing the parallel-time com-
plexity). In addition, the construction obtains a nice incremental property. For any
y of Hamming distance one from x given the computation of f (x), we can compute
f ( y) with only log n invocations of the synthesizer (we can also make this property
hold for y=x+1). We discuss both properties in Section 6.
1.1. Applications of NC-Computable Pseudo Random Functions
The class NC has been criticized as a model for parallel computation for two
main reasons:
v It ignores communication delays and other parameters that determine the
execution time on an actual parallel machine.
v It overemphasizes latency rather than the speedup of problems.
These criticisms seem less valid for the problem of constructing pseudo-random
functions, since (a) it is likely that it will be implemented in a special-purpose
circuit (as there are DES chips) and (b) for some applications of pseudo-random
functions minimizing the latency of computing the functions is essential. Such an
application is the encryption of messages on a network, where the latency of
computing the function is added to the latency of the network. Furthermore, if the
complexity of evaluating a synthesizer on a given input is comparable to that of a
pseudo-random generator, then the work performed by our construction is com-
parable to the one in [26] and we can get optimal speedup.
Note that many of the applications of pseudo-random functions preserve the
parallel-time complexity of the functions. An important example is the Luby and
Rackoff [41] construction of pseudo-random permutations from pseudo-random
functions. Their construction is very simple and involves four invocations of a
pseudo-random function in order to evaluate the pseudo-random permutation at a
given point (see also [45] for an ‘‘optimal’’ construction that requires only two
invocations). Therefore, our constrictions yield (strong) pseudo-random permuta-
tions in NC as well.
There is a deep connection between pseudo-random functions and hardness
results for learning. Since a random function cannot be learned, if a concept class
is strong enough to contain pseudo-random functions we cannot hope to learn it
efficiently. Since no construction of pseudo-random functions in NC was known,
several ways of bypassing this were suggested [3, 37, 38]. However, these are
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1 In their terminology, such a reduction is called poly-preserving. In fact, most of our reductions (as
the reduction from the security of the pseudo-random functions to the security of the pseudo-random
synthesizers) are linear-preserving. The only place where our reductions are not linear-preserving is when
they rely on the hard-card bits of [2, 28].
weaker unlearnability-results than the one obtained by pseudo-random functions.
The existence of pseudo-random functions in a concept class implies that there
exists a distribution of concepts in this class that is hard for every learning algo-
rithm, for every ‘‘nontrivial’’ distribution on inputs even when membership queries
are allowed. Finding such a distribution of concepts is still of interest to learning
theory [33]. We discuss the connection between our work and learning-theory in
Section 9.
Another application of pseudo-random functions in complexity was suggested by
the work of Razborov and Rudich [53] on natural proofs. They showed that if a
circuit-class contains pseudo-random functions (that are secure against a sub-
exponential-time adversary) then there are no, what they called, natural proofs
(which include all known lower bound techniques) for separating this class from
Ppoly. Given our constructions, the existence of natural proofs for separating NC
from Ppoly would imply that several well-established intractability assumptions
are false.
The question of whether pseudo-random functions exist in NC is also interesting
in contrast to the lower bound of Linial, Mansour, and Nisan [39] that there are
no pseudo-random functions in AC0.
1.2. Previous Work
In addition to introducing pseudo-random functions, Goldreich, Goldwasser,
and Micali (GGM) [26] have suggested a construction of such functions from
pseudo-random generators that expand the input by a factor of two (like the one
in [34]). As mentioned above, the GGM construction is sequential in nature. An
idea of Levin [42] is to select some secret hash function h and apply the GGM
construction to h(x) instead of x. If |h(x)|=log2 n, then the depth of the GGM-tree
is only log2 n and presumably we get a pseudo-random function in NC. The
problem with this idea is that we have decreased the security significantly; with
probability 1nlog n the function can be broken, irrespective of the security guaran-
teed by the pseudo-random generator. To put this construction in the ‘‘correct’’
light, suppose that for security parameter k we have some problem whose solution
requires time 2k (on an instance of length polynomial in k). If we would like to have
security 12k for our pseudo-random function, then the Levin construction requires
depth k, whereas our construction requires depth log k.
Impagliazzo and Naor [34] have provided parallel constructions for several
other cryptographic primitives based on the hardness of subset sum (and factoring).
The primitives include pseudo-random generators that expand the input by a
constant factor,2 universal one-way hash functions and strong bit-commitments.
Blum et al. [13] proposed a way of constructing in parallel several cryptographic
primitives based on problems that are hard to learn. We extend their result by
showing that hard-to-learn problems can be used to obtain synthesizers and thus
pseudo-random functions.
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2 They also provided a construction of AC 0 pseudo-random generators with small expansion.
A different line of work [1, 4, 4750, 54], more relevant to derandomization and
saving random bits, is to construct bit-generators such that their output is
indistinguishable from a truly random source to an observer of restricted computa-
tional power (e.g., generators against polynomial-size constant-depth circuits).
Most of these constructions need no unproven assumptions.
In a subsequent work [46] we describe constructions of pseudo-random functions
(and other cryptographic primitives) that are at least as secure as the decisional
version of the DiffieHellman assumption or as the assumption that factoring is
hard. These functions can be computed in NC 1 (in fact, even in TC 0) and are much
more efficient than the concrete constructions of this paper. It is interesting to note
that [46] is motivated by this paper and in particular by the concept of pseudo-
random synthesizers.
1.3. Organization of the Paper
In Section 3 we define pseudo-random synthesizers and collections of pseudo-
random synthesizers and discuss their properties. In Section 4 we describe our
parallel construction of pseudo-random functions from pseudo-random synthesizers
and in Section 5 we prove its security. In Section 6 we describe a related construc-
tion of pseudo-random functions. In addition, we discuss the timespace trade-off
and the incremental property of our constructions. In Section 7 we discuss the
relations between pseudo-random synthesizers and other cryptographic primitives.
In Section 8 we describe constructions of pseudo-random synthesizers based on
several number-theoretic assumptions. In Section 9 we show how to construct
pseudo-random synthesizers from hard-to-learn problems and consider a very
simple concrete example. We also discuss the application of parallel pseudo-random
functions to learning-theory. In Section 10 we suggest topics for further research.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1. Notation
v N denotes the set of all natural numbers.
v In denotes the set of all n-bit strings, [0, 1]n.
v Un denotes the random variable uniformly distributed over I n.
v Let X be any random variable, we denote by Xk_l the k_l matrix whose
entries are independently identically distributed according to X. We denote by Xk
the vector X1_k.
v We identify functions of two variables and functions of one variable in the
natural way. I.e., by letting f: I n_I n [ Ik be equivalent to f: I2n [ Ik and letting
f (x, y) be the same value as f (x b y) (where x b y stands for x concatenated with y).
v Let x be any bit-string, we denote by |x| its length (i.e., the number of bits
in x). This should not be confused with the usage of | } | as absolute value.
v For any two bit-strings of the same length, x and y, the inner product mod
2 of x and y is denoted by x x y.
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2.2. Pseudo-Random Functions
For the sake of completeness and concreteness, we briefly review in this section
the concept of pseudo-random functions almost as it appears in [25]. Another
good reference on pseudo-random functions is [40]. Informally, a pseudo-random
function ensemble is an efficient distribution of functions that cannot be efficiently
distinguished from the uniform distribution. That is, an efficient algorithm that gets
a function as a black box cannot tell (with nonnegligible success probability) from
which of the distributions it was sampled. To formalize this, we first define function
ensembles and efficient function ensembles:
Definition 2.1 (Function ensemble). Let l and k be any two N [ N functions.
An I l [ I k function ensemble is a sequence F=[Fn]n # N of random variables, such
that the random variable Fn assumes values in the set of I l(n) [ I k(n) functions. The
uniform Il [ I k function ensemble, R=[Rn]n # N , has Rn uniformly distributed over
the set of I l(n) [ I k(n) functions.
Definition 2.2 (Efficiently computable function ensemble). A function ensemble,
F=[Fn]n # N , is efficiently computable if there exist probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithms, I and V, and a mapping from strings to functions, ,, such that
,(I(1n)) and Fn are identically distributed and V(i, x)=(,(i))(x). We denote by
fi the function assigned to i (i.e., fi =
def ,(i)). We refer to i as the key of fi and to I
as the key-generating algorithm of F.
For simplicity, we concentrate on the definition of pseudo-random functions and
their construction on length-preserving functions. The distinguisher, in our setting,
is defined to be an oracle machine that can make queries to a length-preserving
function (which is either sampled from the pseudo-random function ensemble or
from the uniform function ensemble). We assume that on input 1n the oracle
machine makes only n-bit queries. For any probabilistic oracle machine, M, and
any I n [ I n function, O, we denote by MO(1n) the distribution of M’s output on
input 1n and with access to O.
Definition 2.3 (Efficiently computable pseudo-random function ensemble). An
efficiently computable In [ In function ensemble, F=[Fn]n # N , is pseudo-random if
for every probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine M, every polynomial p( } ),
and all sufficiently large n’s,
|Pr[MFn (1n)=1]&Pr[MRn (1n)=1]|<
1
p(n)
,
where R=[Rn]n # N is the uniform I n [ I n function ensemble.
In the rest of this paper the term ‘‘pseudo-random functions’’ is used as an
abbreviation for ‘‘efficiently computable pseudo-random function ensemble.’’
Remark 2.1. In the definition above and in the rest of the paper, we interpret
‘‘efficient computation’’ as ‘‘probabilistic polynomial-time’’ and ‘‘negligible’’ as
‘‘smaller than 1poly.’’ This is a rather standard choice and it significantly simplifies
the presentation of the paper. However, from each one of the proofs in this paper
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one can easily extract a more quantitative version of the corresponding result. As
mentioned in the introduction, the different reductions of this paper are security-
preserving in the sense of [32, 40].
3. PSEUDO-RANDOM SYNTHESIZERS
As mentioned above, we introduce in this paper a new cryptographic primitive
called a pseudo-random synthesizer. In this section we define pseudo-random
synthesizers and describe their properties.
3.1. Motivation
Pseudo-random synthesizers are efficiently computable functions of two variables.
The significant feature of such a function, S, is that given polynomially-many uniformly
distributed assignments, (x1 , ..., xm) and ( y1 , ..., ym) , for both variables, the out-
put of S on all the combinations of these assignments, ( f (xi , yj))mi, j=1 , is pseudo-
random (i.e., is indistinguishable from random to a polynomial-time observer). This
is a strengthening of an important property of pseudo-random generatorsthe
indistinguishability of a polynomial sample:
A pseudo-random (bit) generator [14, 61] is a polynomial-time computable
function, G: [0, 1]* [ [0, 1]*, such that \x # I n, |G(x)|=l(n)>n and G(Un) is
pseudo-random (i.e., [G(Un)]n # N and [Ul(n)]n # N are computationally indistinguish-
able). It turns out that this definition implies that: Given polynomially many uniformly
distributed assignments, (z1 , ..., zm) , the sequence [(G(zi)]mi=1 , is pseudo-random.
The major idea behind the definition of pseudo-random synthesizers is to obtain
a function, S, such that [(S(zi)]mi=1 remains pseudo-random even when the z i ’s are
not completely independent. More specifically, pseudo-random synthesizers require
that [(S(zi)]mi=1 remains pseudo-random even when the z i ’s are of the form
[xi b yj]mi, j=1 . This paper shows that (under some standard intractability assump-
tions) it is possible to obtain such a function S and that this property is indeed very
powerful. As a demonstration of their strength, we note below that pseudo-random
synthesizers are useful even when no restriction is made on their output length
(which is very different than what we have for pseudo-random generators).
Remark 3.1. It is important to note that there exist pseudo-random generators
that are not pseudo-random synthesizers. An immediate example is a generator
which is defined by G(x b y) =def G$(x) b y, where G$ is also a pseudo-random gener-
ator. A more natural example is the subset-sum generator [34], G=Ga1 , a2 , ..., an ,
which is defined by G(z)=zi=1 ai . This is not a pseudo-random synthesizer (for
fixed values a1 , a2 , ..., an) since for every four n2-bit strings, x1 , x2 , y1 , and y2 , we
have that G(x1 b y1)+G(x2 b y2)=G(x1 b y2)+G(x2 b y1).
3.2. Formal Definition
We first introduce an additional notation to formalize the phrase ‘‘all different
combinations.’’
342 NAOR AND REINGOLD
Notation 3.1. Let f be an I 2n [ Il function and let X=[x1 , ..., xk] and Y=
[ y1 , ..., ym] be two sequences of n-bit strings. We define Cf (X, Y) to be the k_m
matrix ( f (xi , yj))i, j (C stands for combinations).
We can now define what a pseudo-random synthesizer is.
Definition 3.1 (Pseudo-random synthesizer). Let l be any N [ N function
and let S: [0, 1]*_[0, 1]* [ [0, 1]* be a polynomial-time computable function
such that \x, y # I n, |S(x, y)|=l(n). Then S is a pseudo-random synthesizer if for
every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, D, every two polynomials p( } ) and
m( } ), and all sufficiently large n’s,
|Pr[D(CS(X, Y))=1]&Pr[D((Ul(n))m(n)_m(n))=1]|<
1
p(n)
,
where X and Y are independently drawn from (Un)m(n). (I.e., for random X and Y
the matrix CS(X, Y) cannot be efficiently distinguished from a random matrix.)
3.3. Expanding the Output Length
In Definition 3.1 no restriction was made on the output-length function, l, of the
pseudo-random synthesizer. However, our parallel construction of pseudo-random
functions uses (parallel) pseudo-random synthesizers with linear output length, l(n)=n.
The following lemma shows that any synthesizer, S, can be used to construct another
synthesizer S$, with large output-length, such that S and S$ have the same parallel
time complexity. Therefore, for the construction of pseudo-random functions in NC
it is enough to show the existence of synthesizers with constant output length in NC.
Lemma 3.1. Let S be a pseudo-random synthesizer with arbitrary output-length
function, l, in NC i (resp. AC i). Then for every constant 0<=<2, there exists a
pseudo-random synthesizer S$ in NC i (resp. AC i) such that its output-length function,
l$, satisfies l$(n)=0(n2&=).
Proof. For every constant c>0, define Sc as follows: Let kn =
def
max[k # Z:
kc+1<n]. On input x, y # I n, regard the first kc+1n bits of x and y as two length-k
c
n
sequences, X and Y, of kn -bit strings. S c(x, y) is defined to be CS(X, Y) (viewed as
a single bit-string rather than a matrix). Notice that the following properties hold
for S c :
1. S c is indeed a pseudo-random synthesizer. For any polynomial m( } ), let X$
and Y$ be independently drawn from (Un)m(n) and let X and Y be independently
drawn from (Ukn )
m(n) } kcn. By the definition of S c, the distributions CSc (X$, Y$) and
CS(X, Y) are identical. Taking into account the fact that n is polynomial in kn , we
conclude that every polynomial-time distinguisher for S c is also a polynomial-time
distinguisher for S. Since S is a pseudo-random synthesizer so is S c.
2. Let lc denote the output-length function of S c, then lc(n)=0(n2&2(c+1))).
Since c is a constant and n<(kn+1)c+1, for every n it holds that
lc(n)=(kn)2c } l(kn)(kn)2c=0(n2c(c+1)))=0(n2&2(c+1))).
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3. S c is in NC i (resp. AC i). Immediate from the definition of Sc.
Thus, by taking S$ to be S c for some c>2=&1 we obtain the lemma. K
The construction of Lemma 3.1 has the advantage that it is very simple and that
the parallel-time complexity of S and S$ is identical. Nevertheless, it has an obvious
disadvantage: The security of S$ is related to the security of S on a much smaller
input length. For example, if l(n)=1 and l$(n)=n then the security of S$ on k2-bit
strings is related to the security S on k-bit strings. This results in a substantial
increase in the time and space complexity of any construction that uses S$.
We now show an alternative construction to the one of Lemma 3.1 that is more
security-preserving. The alternative construction uses a pseudo-random generator G
that expands the input by a factor of 2 and relies on the GGM-construction.
Corollary 3.2 ([26]). Let G be a pseudo-random generator in NC i (resp. AC i)
such that \s, |G(s)|=2 |s|. Then for every polynomial p( } ) there exists a pseudo-
random generator G$ in NC i+1 (resp. AC i+1) such that \s, |G$(s)|= p( |s| ) } |s|.
G$ is defined as follows: On input s it computes G(s)=s0 b s1 and recursively
generates p( |s| ) } |s|2 bits from s0 and p( |s| ) } |s|2 bits from s1 . The number of
levels required is Wlog p( |s| )X=O(log |s| ). Using Corollary 3.2 we get
Lemma 3.3. Let S be a pseudo-random synthesizer with arbitrary output-length
function, l, in NC i (resp. AC i). Let G be a pseudo-random generator in NC j (resp.
AC j) such that \s, |G(s)|=2|s|. Let k denote max[i, j+1]. Then for every positive
constant c, there exists a pseudo-random synthesizer S$ in NCk (resp. ACk) such that
its output-length function, l$, satisfies l$(n)=0(n2c } l(n)). Furthermore, the construc-
tion of S$ is linear-preserving in the sense of [32, 40] (the exact meaning of this claim
is described below).
Proof (Sketch). S$ is defined as follows: On input x, y # In, compute X=G$(x)
=[x$1 , ..., x$Wnc X] and Y=G$( y)=[ y$1 , ..., y$Wn c X], where G$ is the pseudo-random
generator that is guaranteed to exist by Corollary 3.2. S$(x, y) is defined to be
CS(X, Y).
It is immediate that S$ is in NCk (resp. ACk) and that l$(n)=0(n2c } l(n)). It is
also not hard to verify that S$ is indeed a pseudo-random synthesizer and (from the
proof of Corollary 3.2) that the construction of S$ is linear-preserving in the follow-
ing sense:
Assume that there exists an algorithm that works in time t(n) and distinguishes
CS$(X$, Y$) from (Ul$(n))m$(n)_m$(n) with bias :(n), where X$ and Y$ are independ-
ently drawn from (Un)m$(n). Let m(n)=m$(n) } WncX . Then one of the following
holds:
1. The same algorithm distinguishes CS(X, Y) from (Ul(n))m(n)_m(n) with bias
:(n)2, where X and Y are independently drawn from (Un)m(n).
2. There exists an algorithm that works in time t(n)+m2(n) } poly(n) and
distinguishes G(Un) from random with bias :(n)O(m(n)). K
The construction of Lemma 3.3 is indeed more security-preserving than the
construction of Lemma 3.1 (since the security of S$ relates to the security of S and
344 NAOR AND REINGOLD
G on the same input length). However, the time complexity of S$ is still substan-
tially larger than the time complexity of S, and the parallel time complexity of S$
might also be larger. Given the drawbacks of both construction, it seems that a
direct construction of efficient and parallel synthesizers with linear output length is
very desirable.
3.4. Collection of Pseudo-Random Synthesizers
A natural way to relax the definition of a pseudo-random synthesizer is to allow
a distribution of functions for every input length rather than a single function. To
formalize this we use the concept of an efficiently computable function ensemble (of
Definition 2.2).
Definition 3.2 (Collection of pseudo-random synthesizers). Let l be any
N [ N function and let S=[Sn]n # N be an efficiently computable I 2n [ Il function
ensemble. S is a collection of I 2n [ I l pseudo-random synthesizers if for every
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, D, every two polynomials p( } ) and m( } ),
and all sufficiently large n’s,
|Pr[D(CSn (X, Y ))=1]&Pr[D((Ul(n))
m(n)_m(n))=1]|<
1
p(n)
,
where X and Y are independently drawn from (Un)m(n).
As shown below, a collection of pseudo-random synthesizers is sufficient for our
construction of pseudo-random functions. Working with a collection of synthesizers
(rather than a single synthesizer) enables us to move some of the computation into
a preprocessing stage during the key-generation. This is especially useful if all other
computations can be done in parallel.
Note that Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.3 easily extend to collections of synthesizers.
4. A PARALLEL CONSTRUCTION OF PSEUDO-RANDOM FUNCTIONS
This section describes the construction of pseudo-random functions, using pseudo-
random synthesizers as building blocks. The intuition of this construction is best
explained through the concept of a k-dimensional pseudo-random synthesizer. This
is a natural generalization of the ‘‘regular’’ (two-dimensional) synthesizer. Infor-
mally, an efficiently computable function of k variables, S k, is a k-dimensional
pseudo-random synthesizer if
Given polynomially many, uniformly chosen, assignments for each variable,
[[aj, i]mi=1]
k
j=1 , the output of S
k on all the combinations M=(Sk(a1, i1 ,
a2, i2 , ..., ak, ik ))
m
i1 , i2 , ..., ik=1
cannot be efficiently distinguished from uniform by
an algorithm that can access M at points of its choice.
Note that this definition is somewhat different from the two-dimensional case.
For any constant k (and in particular for k=2) the matrix M is of polynomial size
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and we can give it as an input to the distinguisher. In general, M might be too large
and therefore we let the distinguisher ‘‘access M at points of its choice.’’
Using this concept, the construction of pseudo-random functions can be described
in two steps:
1. A parallel construction of an n-dimensional synthesizer, S n, from a two-
dimensional synthesizer, S, that has output length l(n)=n. This is a recursive
construction, where the 2k-dimensional synthesizer, S2k, is defined using a k-dimen-
sional synthesizer, S k,
S2k(x1 , x2 , ..., x2k) =
def S k(S(x1 , x2), S(x3 , x4), ..., S(x2k&1 , x2k)).
2. An immediate construction of the pseudo-random function, f, from Sn:
f(a1, 0 , a1, 1 , a2, 0 , a2, 1 , ..., an, 0 , an, 1 )(x) =
def Sn(a1, x1 , a2, x2 , ..., an, xn ).
In fact, pseudo-random functions can be constructed from a collection of
synthesizers. In this case, for each level of the recursion a different synthesizer is
sampled from the collection. As will be noted below, for some collections of syn-
thesizers (as those constructed in this paper) it is enough to sample a single synthesizer
for all levels.
4.1. Formal Definition
The following operation on sequences is used in the construction.
Definition 4.1. For every function S: I2n [ In and every sequence, L=
[l1 , l2 , ..., lk], of n-bit strings define SQS(L) to be the sequence L$=[l$1 , ..., l$Wk2X],
where l$i=S(l2i&1 , l2i) for iwk2x and if k is odd, then l$Wk2X=lk (SQ stands for
squeeze).
We now turn to the construction itself.
Construction 4.1 (Pseudo-random functions). Let S=[Sn]n # N be a collection
of I2n [ In pseudo-random synthesizers and let IS be a probabilistic polynomial-
time key-generating algorithm for S (as in Definition 2.2). For every possible value,
k, of IS(1n), denote by sk the corresponding I2n [ In function. The function ensemble
F=[Fn]n # N is defined as
v Key-generation. On input 1n, the probabilistic polynomial-time key-generat-
ing algorithm IF outputs a pair (a, k), where a=[a1, 0 , a1, 1 , a2, 0 , a2, 1 , ..., an, 0 , an, 1] is
sampled from (Un)2n and k=[k1 , k2 , ..., kWlog nX] is generated by Wlog nX independent
executions of IS on input 1
n (i.e., is sampled from (IS(1
n))Wlog nX).
v Evaluation. For every possible value, (a, k), of IF (1n) the function fa, k : I n
[ I n is defined as follows: On an n-bit input, x=x1 x2 } } } xn , the function outputs
the single value in
SQsk1 (SQsk2 ( } } } SQsk Wlog nX([a1, x1 , a2, x2 , ..., an, xn ]) } } } )).
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Finally, Fn is defined to be the random variable that assumes as values the func-
tions fa, k with the probability space induced by IF (1n).
The evaluation of fa, k(x) can be thought of as a recursive labeling process of a
binary tree with n leaves and depth Wlog nX. The ith leaf has two possible labels, ai, 0
and ai, 1 . The ith input bit, xi selects one of these labels ai, xi . The label of each
internal node at depth d is the value of skd+1 on the labels of its children. The value
of fa, k(x) is simply the label of the root. (Figure 1 illustrates the evaluation of fa, k
for n=5.) We note that this labeling process is very different than the one associated
with the GGM-construction [26]. First, the binary tree is of depth Wlog nX, instead
of depth n as in [26]. Second, the labeling process is bottomup, instead of top
down as in [26] (i.e., starting at the leaves instead of the root). Moreover, here
each input defines a different labeling of the tree, whereas in [26] the labeling of
the tree is fully determined by the key (and the input only determines a leaf such
that its label is the value of the function on this input).
4.2. Efficiency of the Construction
It is clear that F is efficiently computable (given that S is efficiently computable).
Furthermore, the parallel time complexity of functions in Fn is larger by a factor of
O(log n) than the parallel time complexity of functions in Sn . The parallel time
complexity of IS and IF is identical.
We note that for simplicity the parameter n serves a double role; n is both the
length of inputs to fa, k # Fn and the security parameter for such a function (the
second role is expressed by the fact that the strings in a are n-bit long). In practice,
however, these roles would be separated. The security parameter would be determined
by the quality of the synthesizers and the length of inputs to the pseudo-random
functions would be determined by their application. In fact, one can usually use a
pseudo-random function with a reasonably small input-length (say 160-bits long to
prevent a ‘‘birthday attack’’). This is implied by the suggestion of Levin [42] to
pair-wise independently hash the input before applying the pseudo-random function
(this idea is described with more details in the Introduction).
FIG. 1. Computing the value of the pseudo-random function for n=5.
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4.3. Reducing the Key Length
An apparent disadvantage of Construction 4.1 is the large key length of a func-
tion fa, k # Fn . In particular, the sequence a is defined by 2n2 bits. However, this is
not truly a problem since: (a) In Section 6.1 a related construction is described
(Construction 6.1), where a consists of a constant number of strings (and is, there-
fore, defined by O(n) bits). (b) The truly random sequence a can be replaced by a
pseudo-random sequence without increasing the depth of the construction (by more
than a constant factor). This is achieved as follows: Let G be a pseudo-random
generator that expands the input by a factor of 2. Let G$ be the pseudo-random
generator that can be constructed from G according to Corollary 3.2 for p(n)=2n
(i.e., by using Wlog n+1X levels of the recursion). Then a can be replaced by G$(a~ ),
where a~ is an n-bit seed.
In addition to a, the key of fa, k # Fn consists of Wlog nX keys of functions in Sn .
It turns out that for some collections of synthesizers (such as those described in this
paper) this overhead can be eliminated as well. This is certainly true when using
a single synthesizer instead of a collection. Moreover, from the proof of security for
Construction 4.1 one can easily extract the following claim: If the collection of
synthesizers remains secure even when it uses a public key (i.e., if Csk(X, Y) remains
pseudo-random even when the distinguisher sees k), then the Wlog nX keys can be
replaced with a single one (i.e., the same key can be used at all levels of the recursion).
5. SECURITY OF THE CONSTRUCTION
Theorem 5.1. Let S and F be as in Construction 4.1 and let R=[Rn]n # N be the
uniform In [ I n function ensemble. Then F is an efficiently computable pseudo-
random function ensemble. Furthermore, any efficient distinguisher, M, between F
and R yields an efficient distinguisher, D, for S such that the success probability of
D is smaller by a factor of at most Wlog nX than the success probability of M.
To prove Theorem 5.1, we use of a hybrid argument (for details about this proof
technique, see [25]). We first define a sequence of Wlog nX+1 function distribu-
tions such that the two extreme distributions are Rn and Fn . We then show that any
distinguisher for two neighboring distributions can be transformed into a distinguisher
for the pseudo-random synthesizers. For simplicity, we define those hybrid-distribu-
tions in case n=2l. The definition easily extends to a general value of n such that
Claim 5.1 still holds.
For any 0 jl, denote by H jn the j th hybrid distribution. The computation of
functions in H jn may be described as a labeling process of a binary tree with n leaves
and depth l (an analogous description for Fn appears in Section 4). Here, the label-
ing process starts with nodes at depth l& j. The i th such node has 22 j possible
labels, [ai, s : s # I2
j ] (which are part of the key). The i th 2 j-bit substring of the
input, xi , selects one of these labels, ai, xi . The rest of the labeling process is
the same as it was for functions in Fn ; the label of each node at depth d<l& j
is the value of skd+1 on the labels of its children. The value of the function on this
input is simply the label of the root.
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Another way to think of H jn is via the concept of a k-dimensional synthesizer (see
Section 4). As was the case for F n, the construction of functions in H jn can be
described in two steps: (1) a recursive construction of a 2l& j-dimensional synthesizer,
S2 l&j, from a two-dimensional synthesizer, S; (2) an immediate construction of the
pseudo-random function, f, from S2 l&j,
f[ar, s : 1r2l&j , s # I2 j ](x1 b x2 b } } } b x2l&j) =
def S 2l&j (a1, x1 , a2, x2 , ..., a2l& j, x 2l&j ).
We turn to the formal definition of the hybrid distributions.
Definition 5.1. Let IS be the key-generating algorithms of S. Let n, l, and j be
three integers such that n=2l and 0 jl. For every sequence, k=[k1 , k2 , ..., kl& j]
of possible values of IS(1
n) and for every length-22
j
2l& j sequence of n-bit strings,
a=[ar, s : 1r2l& jn, s # I 2
j] the function fa, k : I n [ I n is defined as follows: On
input x=x1 b x2 b } } } b x2 l&j , where \1i2l& j, x i # I 2
j
, the function outputs the
single value in
SQsk1 (SQsk2 ( } } } SQskl&j (a1, x1 , a2, x2 , ..., a2l&j, x 2
l&j ) } } } )).
H jn is the random variable that assumes as values the functions fa, k defined above,
where the ki ’s are independently distributed according to IS(1n) and a is independ-
ently distributed according to (Un)2
2j 2l&j.
This definition immediately implies that
Claim 5.1. H 0n and Fn are identically distributed and H
Wlog nX
n and Rn are identi-
cally distributed.
The proof below shows that for every 0 j<l the two neighboring ensembles
H jn and H
j+1
n are computationally indistinguishable. As shown below, this implies
Theorem 5.1 by a standard hybrid argument.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. As mentioned in Section 4, it is obvious that F is an
efficiently computable function ensemble. Assume that F is not pseudo-random. By
the definition of pseudo-random function ensembles, there exists a polynomial-time
oracle machine, M, and a polynomial p( } ) so that for infinitely many n’s
|Pr[MFn (1n)=1]&Pr[MRn (1n)=1]|>
1
p(n)
,
where R=[Rn]n # N is the uniform I n [ In function ensemble. Let t( } ) be a polyno-
mial that bounds the number queries that M makes on input 1n.
Given M, we define the probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D that dis-
tinguishes the output of Sn from a random one. Let m=m(n) be defined by
m(n) =def t(n) } n. For every n, the input of D is an m(n)_m(n) matrix, B=(b i, j),
whose entries are n-bit strings. As part of its algorithm, D invokes M on input 1n.
The definition of m allows D to answer all the queries of M (which are bounded
by t(n)). It will be shown below that D distinguishes between the following two
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distributions of B: (a) CSn(X, Y), where X and Y are independently drawn from
(Un)m(n); (b) (Un)m(n)_m(n).
For simplicity of presentation, we only define the algorithm that D performs for
n=2l. It is easy to extend this definition to a general value of n such that Claim 5.2
and Claim 5.3 still hold. On input B=(bi, j)m(n)i, j=1 , the algorithm is defined as
follows:
1. Choose 0J<l uniformly at random.
2. Generate k=[k1 , k2 , ..., kl&J&1] by l&J&1 independent executions of
IS on input 1
n.
3. Extract 2l&J&1 submatrices of B: For 1i2l&J&1 denote by B i=
(b iu, v)
t(n)
u, v=1 the t(n)_t(n) diagonal submatrix of B defined by
biu, v =
def bu+((i&1) } t(n)+1), v+((i&1) } t(n)+1) .
4. Invoke M on input 1n. Denote by qr=qr1 b q
r
2 b } } } b q
r
2 l&J the rth query M
makes, where qri # I
2 J for 1i2l&J. On each of these queries D answers as
follows: For every 1i2l&J&1, denote by ai, qr2i&1 b qr2i the entry b
i
u, v of B
i, where
u=min[1 jr: q j2i&1=q
r
2i&1]
and
v=min[1 jr: q j2i=q
r
2i].
Answer the query with the single value in
SQsk1 ( } } } SQskl&J&1 ([a1, q
r
1 b q
r
2
, ..., a2l&J&1, qr2 l&J&1 b qr2 l&J ]) } } } ).
5. Output whatever M outputs.
It is obvious that D is a polynomial-time algorithm. To show that D is also a
distinguisher for the pseudo-random synthesizers, we first state and prove the
following two claims.
Claim 5.2. For every 0J<l,
Pr[D((Un)m(n)_m(n))=1 | J= j]=Pr[MH n
j+1
(1n)=1].
Proof. As part of its algorithm, D denotes some of B’s entries by names of the
form ‘‘ar, s ,’’ where 1r2l&J&1 and s # I 2
J+1
. Note that D never denotes an entry
of B by two different names. Assume, for the sake of the proof that any name ar, s
that was not used by D is assigned an independently and uniformly distributed
n-bit string. Denote by a the sequence [ar, s : 1r2l&J&1, s # I 2
J+1]. It is easy to
verify that:
1. When B is uniformly distributed, the distribution of a is identical to
(Un)2
2J+12l&J&1.
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2. D answers every query, q, of M with the value fa, k(q), where fa, k is as in
the definition of H J+1n .
The claim immediately follows from (1) and (2) and from the definition of k. K
Claim 5.3. Let X and Y be independently drawn from (Un)m(n). Then for every
0J<l,
Pr[D(CSn (X, Y ))=1 | J= j]=Pr[M
H jn (1n)=1].
Proof. Let X=[x1 , x2 , ..., xm(n)] and Y=[ y1 , y2 , ..., ym(n)] be independently
drawn from (Un)m(n) and let sk be drawn from Sn . Assume that the input of D is
B=Csk (X, Y). For the sake of the proof, define the vector a$=[a$i, s : 1i2
l&J,
s # I2 J ] as follows:
v If D denoted by ai, q r2i&1 b q r2i is the entry b
i
u, v of B
i, then define a$2i&1, qr2i&1 to
be x(i&1) } t(n)+u and a$2i, qr2i to be y(i&1) } t(n)+v . Note that ai, q r2i&1 b q r2i=sk(a$2i&1, qr2i&1 ,
a$2i, qr2i ).
v For all other values in a$ assign an independently and uniformly distributed
n-bit string.
It is easy to verify that the distribution of a$ is identical to (Un)2
2J2l&J. Let k$ be
the sequence [k1 , k2 , ..., kl&J&1 , k] and let fa$, k$ be as in the definition of H Jn . We
now have that the answer D gives to the rth query, qr, of M is
SQsk1 ( } } } SQskl&J&1 ([a1, q
r
1 b q
r
2
, ..., a2l&J&1, qr2 l&J&1 b q r2 l&J ]) } } } )
=SQsk1 ( } } } SQskl&J&1 (SQsk ([a$1, q
r
1
, a$2, qr2 , ..., a$2l&J, qr2l&J ])) } } } )
= fa$, k$(qr).
From this fact and from the definition of a$ and k$, we immediately get the claim.
K
By Claims 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, we can now conclude the following: Let X and Y be
independently drawn from (Un)m(n); then for infinitely many n’s,
|Pr[D(CSn (X, Y ))=1]&Pr[D((Un)
m(n)_m(n))=1]|
=
1
Wlog nX
} } :
Wlog nX&1
j=0
Pr[D(CSn (X, Y ))=1 | J= j]
& :
Wlog nX&1
j=0
Pr[D((Un)m(n)_m(n))=1 | J=1] }
=
1
Wlog nX
} } :
Wlog nX&1
j=0
Pr[MH
j
n (1n)=1]& :
Wlog nX&1
j=0
Pr[MH n
j+1
(1n)=1]}
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=
1
Wlog nX
} |Pr[MH
0
n (1n)=1]&Pr[MH n
Wlog nX
(1n)=1]|
=
1
Wlog nX
} |Pr[MFn (1n)=1]&Pr[MRn (1n)=1]|
>
1
p(n) } Wlog nX
.
This contradicts the assumption that S is a collection of pseudo-random
synthesizers and completes the proof of Theorem 5.1. K
Corollary 5.2. For any collection of pseudo-random synthesizers, S, such that
its functions are computable in NC i there exists an efficiently computable pseudo-
random function ensemble, F, such that its functions are computable in NC i+1.
Furthermore, the corresponding key-generating algorithms, IS and IF , have the same
parallel time complexity.
Proof. By Lemma 3.1, we can construct from, S, a new collection of I2n [ I n
pseudo-random synthesizers, S$, such that its functions are computable in NC i. By
Theorem 5.1, we can construct from S$ an efficiently computable pseudo-random
function ensemble, F, such that its functions are computable in NC i+1. Both con-
structions preserve the parallel time complexity of the key-generating algorithms.
K
6. A RELATED CONSTRUCTION AND ADDITIONAL PROPERTIES
Although designed to enable efficient computation in parallel, Construction 4.1
obtains some additional useful properties. In this section we describe two such
properties: a rather sharp timespace trade-off and an incremental property. We
also show how to adjust the construction in order to improve upon these properties.
6.1. TimeSpace Trade-off
Construction 4.1 has the advantage of a sharp timespace trade-off. In order to
get an even sharper trade-off, we describe an alternative construction of pseudo-
random functions. The best way to understand the revised construction is by view-
ing the computation process backwards: Every function on n-bits is defined by the
length-2n sequence of all its values. Assume that we could sample and store two
length-W- 2nX sequences, X and Y, of random strings as the key of a pseudo-random
function. In this case, given a pseudo-random synthesizer, S, we can define the 2n
values of the pseudo-random function to be the entries of the matrix CS(X, Y). In
order to reduce the key size, we can replace the random sequences, X and Y, with
pseudo-random sequences. Such sequences X and Y can be obtained together from
CS(X$, Y$), where X$ and Y$ are two shorter random sequences (of length
approximately - 2 } 2n2). By continuing this process of reducing the key size log n
times, we get a key with constant number of strings (see Fig. 2 for an illustration
of the construction).
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FIG. 2. Illustration of the alternative construction.
In order to understand where the original construction is ‘‘wasteful’’ in the size
of the key we can describe it in similar terms: The 2n values of the function are still
the values of CS(X, Y) for two sequences X and Y (in the description of the com-
putation as a tree-labeling process these are all the possible labels of the root’s
children), but then we get X and Y separately as CS(X$, Y$) and CS(X", Y"). By the
time the sequences have constant-length, there are O(n) of those.
Returning to the new construction, note that if we allow a key of m strings we
only need trlog n&log log m of the steps described above. Computing such func-
tions requires t phases and in each phase several parallel invocations of S. The total
number of invocations of S is 2t&1r(nlog m). This seems to be a relatively sharp
timespace trade-off and, to the best of our knowledge, one that cannot be obtained
by the GGM-construction.
For some applications, like the protection of the data on a disk, we need pseudo-
random functions with reasonably small amount of entries. In this case, by storing
relatively few strings, we can achieve a very easy-to-compute function. For example,
512 random l-bit strings define a pseudo-random I30 [ I l function. Computing this
function requires only three invocations of a pseudo-random synthesizer in two
phases.
We formalize the definition of the alternative construction.
Construction 6.1 (Alternative construction of pseudo-random functions). Let
S=[Sn]n # N be a collection of I 2n [ I n pseudo-random synthesizers and let IS be
a probabilistic polynomial-time key-generating algorithm for S (as in Definition 2.2).
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For every possible value, k, of IS(1n), denote by sk the corresponding I 2n [ In function.
The function ensemble F=[Fn]n # N is defined as follows:
v Key-generation. Let mj denote the value 2 j+2 and let tn denote the
smallest integer t such that mtn. On input 1n, the probabilistic polynomial-time
key-generating algorithm IF outputs a pair (a, k), where a=[a0 , a1 , ..., a2m 0&1] is
generated according to (Un)2
m 0 and k=[k1 , k2 , ..., ktn] is generated by tn independ-
ent executions of IS on input 1
n (i.e., is sampled from (IS(1
n))tn ).
v Evaluation. For every possible value, (a, k), of IF (1
n) and every j such
that 0 jtn , define the function f ja, k : I
mj [ I n in recursion on j : For x # I m0,
define f 0a, k(x) to be ax . For any j>0 and x=x1 b x2 # I
mj (x1 and x2 are (2 j&1+1)-
bit strings) define f ia, k(x) to be skj ( f
j&1
a, k (0, x1), f
j&1
a, k (1, x2)).
For every x # In the value of the function fa, k : I n [ In on x is defined to be
f tna, k(x$), where x$ is obtained by padding x with mtn&n zeros.
Finally, Fn is defined to be the random variable that assumes as values the
functions fa, k with the probability space induced by IF (1n).
The proof of security for Construction 6.1 is omitted since it is almost identical
to the proof of security for Construction 4.1.
We can now state the exact form of the timespace trade-off under the notation of
Construction 6.1. If a contains 2mi strings instead of 2m0, then we can define f ia, k(x) to
be a distinct value in a for every x # Imi and keep the recursive definition of f ja, k as before
for j>i. In this case, computing fa, k(x) can be done in tn&i phases with a total of
2tn&i&1 invocations of the synthesizers. The next lemma follows (for simplicity this
lemma is stated in terms of a synthesizer instead of a collection of synthesizers).
Lemma 6.1. Let S be a pseudo-random synthesizer with output-length function
l(n)=n. Assume that S can be computed in parallel-time D(n) and work W(n) (on
n-bit inputs). Then for every m=m(n) such that 2m0m(n)<2n there exists an
efficiently computable pseudo-random function ensemble F=[Fn]n # N such that the
key of a function in Fn is a sequence of at most m(n) random n-bit strings and this
function can be computed in parallel-time (log n&log log m(n)+O(1)) D(n) and
using work of O(nlog m(n)) W(n).
6.2. Incremental Property
We now describe an observation of Mihir Bellare that gives rise to an interesting
incremental property of our construction. (For the formulation and treatment of
incremental cryptography, see the work of Bellare, Goldreich, and Goldwasser
[7, 8].)
Let f be any function in Fn , where F=[Fn]n # N is the pseudo-random function
ensemble defined in Construction 4.1. Let x, y # I n be of Hamming distance one (x
and y differ on exactly one bit). Then, given the computation of f (x) (including all
intermediate values), we only need additional log n invocations of the pseudo-ran-
dom synthesizers (instead of n) in order to evaluate f ( y). The easiest way to see the
correctness of this observation is to recall the description of the computation of f (x)
as a labeling process on a depth-log n binary tree. The only labels that change as
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a result of flipping one bit of x are those of the nodes on a path from one leaf to
the root (i.e., log n+1 labels).
If a Gray-code representation3 of numbers is used, we get a similar observation
for the computation of f (x) and f (x+1): Given the computation of one of these
values, computing the other requires only additional log n invocations of the
pseudo-random synthesizers. It is not hard to imagine situations where one of these
incremental properties is useful.
The observation regarding the computation of f (x) and f ( y), for x and y of
Hamming distance one, also holds for the functions of Construction 6.1. The obser-
vation regarding the computation of f (x) and f (x+1) holds if we use a different
representation of numbers (this representation is similar to a Gray-code, although
a bit more complicated).
7. CONSTRUCTION OF PSEUDO-RANDOM SYNTHESIZERS BASED ON
GENERAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES
Sections 79 are mostly devoted to showing parallel constructions of pseudo-
random synthesizers. In this section we provide a simple construction of pseudo-
random synthesizers based on what we call weak pseudo-random functions. This
construction immediately implies a construction of pseudo-random synthesizers
based on trapdoor one-way permutations (and an additional construction, based
on any hard-to-learn problem, which is considered in Section 9). An interesting line
for further research is the parallel construction of pseudo-random synthesizers from
other cryptographic primitives. In particular, we do not know of such a construc-
tion from pseudo-random generators or directly from one-way functions.
7.1. Weak Pseudo-Random Functions
The reason pseudo-random functions are hard to construct is that they must
endure a very powerful kind of attack. The adversary (the distinguishes) may query
their values at every point and may adapt its queries based on the answers it gets.
We can weaken the opponent by letting the only access it has to the function be
a polynomial sample of random points and the value of the function at these points.
We call functions that look random to such an adversary weak pseudo-random
functions. In this section it is shown that weak pseudo-random functions yield pseudo-
random synthesizers in a straightforward manner. We therefore get a parallel construc-
tion of (standard) pseudo-random functions from weak pseudo-random functions.
For simplicity, we define weak pseudo-random functions as length-preserving. In
their definition we use the following notation.
Notation 7.1. For every function f and every sequence X=[x1 } } } xk] of values
in the domain of f, denote by V(X, f ) the sequence [x1 , f (x1), x2 , f (x2) } } } xk , f (xk)]
(V stands for values).
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3 A permutation, P, on In is called a Gray-code representation if for every 0x<2n the Hamming
distance between P(x) and P(x+1 mod 2n) is one. Such a P defines a Hamiltonian cycle on the n-dimen-
sional cube. It is not hard to see that any easy-to-compute P can be defined.
Definition 7.1 (Collection of weak pseudo-random functions). An efficiently
computable In [ I n function ensemble F=[Fn]n # N is a collection of weak
pseudo-random functions if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, D,
every two polynomials p( } ) and m( } ), and all sufficiently large n’s,
|Pr[D(V((Un)m(n), Fn))=1]&Pr[D((Un)2m(n))=1]|<
1
p(n)
.
Let F be a collection of weak pseudo-random functions and let I be the polyno-
mial-time key-generating algorithm for F. Lemma 7.1 shows how to construct a
pseudo-random synthesizer from F and I. Since the random bits of I can be
replaced by pseudo-random bits, we can assume that I only uses n truly random
bits on input 1n. In fact, this is only a simplifying assumption which is not really
required for the construction of pseudo-random synthesizers. For every r # In,
denote by Ir(1
n) the value of I(1n) when I uses r as its random bits.
Lemma 7.1. Let F and I be as above and define S: [0, 1]*_[0, 1]* [ [0, 1]*
such that \x, y # In, S(x, y)= fIy (1n)(x). Then S is a pseudo-random synthesizer.
Proof. It is obvious that S is efficiently computable. Assume, in contradiction
to the lemma, that S is not a pseudo-random synthesizer. Then there exists a
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, D, and polynomials p( } ) and m( } ), such
that for infinitely many n’s
|Pr[D(CS(X, Y))=1]&Pr[D((Un)m(n)_m(n))=1]|>
1
p(n)
,
where X and Y are independently drawn from (Un)m(n).
For every n and every 0im(n), define the ith hybrid distribution H in over
m(n)_m(n) matrices as follows: The first i columns are distributed according to
CS(X, Y), where X is drawn from (Un)m(n) and Y is independently drawn from
(Un) i. The last m(n)&i columns are independently distributed according to
(Un)m(n)_(m(n)&i). It is immediate that for infinitely many n’s
|Pr[D(H m(n)n )=1]&Pr[D(H
0
n)=1]|>
1
p(n)
.
We now define a distinguisher D$ for F. Given [x1 , z1 , x2 , z2 , ..., xm(n) , zm(n)] as
its input, D$ performs the algorithm:
1. Define X=[x1 , ..., xm(n)] and Z=[z1 , ..., zm(n)].
2. Uniformly choose 0<Jm(n).
3. Sample Y from (Un)J&1 and generate an m(n)_m(n) matrix B whose first
J&1 columns are CS(X, Y), its Jth column is Zt and the last m(n)&J columns are
independently distributed according to (Un)m(n)_(m(n)&J).
4. Output D(B).
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It is obvious that D$ is efficiently computable. It is also easy to verify that
Pr[D$(V((Un)m(n), Fn))=1 | J= j]=Pr[D(H jn)=1]
and that
Pr[D$((Un)2m(n))=1 | J= j]=Pr[D(H j&1n )=1].
Thus, by a standard hybrid argument, we get that for infinitely many n’s
|Pr[D$(V((Un)m(n), Fn))=1]&Pr[D$((Un)2m(n))=1]|>
1
p(n) m(n)
,
in contradiction to the assumption that F is a collection of weak pseudo-random
functions. We can therefore conclude the lemma. K
Notice that S (as in Lemma 7.1) obeys an even more powerful requirement than
is needed by the definition of a pseudo-random synthesizer: For random X and Y
the matrix CS(X, Y) cannot be efficiently distinguished from a random matrix, even
if we allow the distinguisher access to X.
Corollary 7.2 (of Lemma 7.1). If there exist weak pseudo-random functions
that can be sampled and evaluated in NC, then there also exist a pseudo-random
synthesizer in NC and (standard ) pseudo-random functions that can be sampled and
evaluated in NC.
7.2. Trapdoor One-Way Permutations
We now describe a rather simple construction of weak pseudo-random functions
from a collection of trapdoor permutations. Therefore, given Lemma 7.1, we get a
construction of a pseudo-random synthesizer out of a collection of trapdoor
permutations. This pseudo-random synthesizer is in NC if the trapdoor permuta-
tions can be sampled and inverted in NC (in fact, there is an additional requirement
of a hard-core predicate in NC but this is already satisfied by [28]). Since we have
no concrete example of this sort, we only, givers brief and informal description of
the construction (for formal definitions of trapdoor one-way permutations and
hard-core bits see, e.g. [25, 40]).
Let F=[Fn]n # N be a permutation ensemble such that every fi # Fn is a permuta-
tion over a domain Dn . Informally, F is a collection of trapdoor one-way permuta-
tions if the key generating algorithm IF of F outputs both a public-key, i, and a
trapdoor-key, t(i), and we have:
v Given i, the function fi is easy to compute everywhere but hard to invert on
the average.
v Given t(i) the function fi is easy to compute and to invert everywhere.
Let F=[Fn : Dn [ Dn]n # N be a collection of trapdoor one-way permutations.
Assume that the collection is one-way for the uniform distribution over the inputs
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(i.e., it is hard to compute x given Fn(x), where x is uniformly distributed in Dn).
Let the sequence of functions [bn : Dn [ I 1]n # N be a hard-core predicate for F.
Informally, this means that, given Fn(x) for a uniformly distributed x, it is hard to
guess bn(x) with probability which is nonnegligibly better than half. We can now
define a collection of weak pseudo-random functions G=[Gn]n # N in the following
way:
For every x # In, denote by Dn(x) the element in Dn sampled using x as the
random bits. For every key i of f i # Fn , define g i : In [ I 1 as
\x # In, gi (x) =
def bn( f &1i (Dn(x))).
(Note that computing gi (x) requires knowledge of the trapdoor-key t(i).) Let
Gn be the random variable that assumes as values the functions gi with the
probability space induced by the distribution over the keys in Fn .
Claim 7.1 (Without proof). The function ensemble G which is defined above is
a collection of weak pseudo-random functions.
8. NUMBER-THEORETIC CONSTRUCTIONS OF
PSEUDO-RANDOM SYNTHESIZERS
In this section we present several NC1 constructions of pseudo-random synthesizers
based on concrete, frequently used, intractability assumptions. The first construc-
tion is at least as secure as the DiffieHellman [21] assumption. As we shall see in
Section 8.3, we also get a construction that is at least as secure as factoring (since
the DiffieHellman assumption modulo a composite is not stronger than factoring
[44, 58] (also see [10])). Finally, we show two constructions that are at least as
secure as the RSA assumption [55]. Although the RSA assumption is not weaker
than factoring, the constructions based on RSA might have other advantages. For
example, under the assumption that 0(n) least-significant bits are simultaneously
hard for RSA, we get pseudo-random synthesizers with linear output length. In
addition, the constructions based on RSA and their proof of security use several
interesting ideas that might be useful elsewhere. We first address issues that are
common to all constructions.
The evaluation of our pseudo-random synthesizers in NC1 relies on a preprocess-
ing stage. This stage can be performed as part of the (sequential) key-generating
algorithm. In this idea we follow the work of Kearns and Valiant [37]. In their
context, the additional data is ‘‘forced’’ into the input, whereas in our context it is
added to the key.
The analysis of the parallel-time complexity of the synthesizers uses previous
results on the parallel-time complexity of arithmetic operations (see Karp and
Ramachandran [36] for a review). In particular, we use the result of Beame, Cook,
and Hoover, [6]. They showed that iterated multiplication (multiplying n numbers
of length n) and additional related operations can be performed by log-depth circuits
(these circuits can be constructed efficiently, although sequentially). The results of [6]
enable the computation of modular exponentiation in NC 1, given preprocessing
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that only depends on the base. This follows from the fact that computing be mod N
is reduced to an iterated multiplication (and an additional modular reduction),
given the values bi mod N (where 0i the length of e).
The pseudo-random synthesizers constructed in this section are Boolean functions.4
Section 3.3 showed two methods for expanding the output length of pseudo-random
synthesizers. The method of Lemma 3.1 requires a pseudo-random generator that
expands the input by a factor of two. A natural choice for this purpose (in the case
of the synthesizers which are described in this section) is the pseudo-random gener-
ators of Blum, Blum, and Shub [11] or the one of Hastad, Schrift, and Shamir
[30]. Given appropriate preprocessing, both generators can be computed in NC1
and their security is based on the assumption that factoring integers (Blum integers
in [30]) is hard.
We note that all the constructions of this section give collections of pseudo-
random synthesizers. However, the security of theses synthesizers does not rely on
keeping their key private. As discussed in Section 4.3, this allows us to use a single
synthesizer at all the levels of Construction 4.1 (and of Construction 6.1).
8.1. Common Tools
In our constructions, we use the result of Goldreich and Levin [28] which gives
a hard-core predicate for ‘‘any’’ one-way function.
Theorem 8.1 [28]. Let f be any one-way function. For every probabilistic poly-
nomial-time algorithm, A, for every polynomial, p( } ), and all sufficiently large n’s,
Pr[A( f (x), r)=r x x]<
1
2
+
1
p(n)
,
where x and r are independently drawn from Un (recall that r x x denotes the inner
product mod 2 of r and x).
In fact, we use their result in a slightly different context. Loosely speaking, if
given f (x) it is hard to compute g(x), then given f (x) it is also hard to guess
g(x) x r. An important improvement on the application of [28] in the context of
the DiffieHellman assumption was made by Shoup [57].
In addition, the proof of security for all the constructions uses the next-bit predic-
tion tests of Blum and Micali [14]. The equivalence between pseudo-random
ensembles and ensembles that pass all polynomial-time next-bit tests was shown by
Yao [61].
8.2. The DiffieHellman Assumption
We now define a collection of pseudo-random synthesizers that are at least as
secure as the DiffieHellman assumption (DH-assumption). This assumption was
introduced in the seminal paper of Diffie and Hellman [21] (as a requirement for
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4 In fact, all these synthesizers can be made to output a logarithmic number of bits. Furthermore,
given stronger assumptions they may output an even larger number of bits. see Remark 8.2 nor an example.
the security of their key-exchange protocol). The validity of the DH-assumption
was studied quite extensively over the last two decades. A few notable representatives
of this research are [15, 43, 57]. Maurer [43] and Boneh and Lipton [15] have
shown that in several settings the DH-assumption is equivalent to the assumption
that computing the discrete log is hard. In particulars for any specific prime P there
is an efficient reduction (given some information that only depends on P) of the
discrete-log problem in Z*P to the DH-problem in Z*P . Shoup [57] has shown that
the DH-assumption holds against what he calls ‘‘generic’’ algorithms.
For concreteness, we state the DH-assumption in the group Z*P , where P is a
prime. However, our construction works just as well given the DH-assumption in
other groups. We use this fact in Section 8.3 to get pseudo-random synthesizers
which are at least as secure as factoring. In order to formalize the DH-assumption
in Z*P , we need to specify the distribution of P. One possible choice is to let P be
a uniformly distributed prime of a given length. However, there are other possible
choices. For example, it is not inconceivable that P can be fixed for any given
length. To keep our results general, we let P be generated by some polynomial-time
algorithm IGDH (where IG stands for instance generator).
Definition 8.1 (IGDH). The DiffieHellman instance generator, IGDH , is a
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm such that on input 1n the output of IGDH
is distributed over n-bit primes.
In addition, we need to specify the distribution of a generator, g, of Z*P . It can
be shown that if the DH-assumption holds for some distribution of g, then it also
holds if we let g be a uniformly distributed generator of Z*P (since there exists a
simple randomized reduction of the DH-problem for any g to the DH-problem with
a uniformly distributed g).
All exponentiations in the rest of this subsection are in Z*P (the definition of P
will be clear by the context). To simplify the notations, we omit the expression
‘‘mod P’’ from now on. We can now formally state the DH-assumption (for the
instance generator given IGDH).
Assumption 8.1 (DiffieHellman [21]). For every probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm, A, for every polynomial, q( } ) and all sufficiently large n’s
Pr[A(P, g, ga, gb)= gab]<
1
q(n)
,
where the distribution of P is IGDH(1n), the distribution of g is uniform over the
set of generators of Z*P , and the distribution of (a, b) is (Un)2.
Based on this assumption we define a collection of I2n [ I 1 pseudo-random
synthesizers, SDH .
Definition 8.2. For every n-bit prime, P, every generator, g, of Z*P , and every
r # In, define sP, g, r : I 2n [ I 1 by
\x, y # I n, sP, g, r(x, y) =
def gxy x r.
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Let Sn be the random variable that assumes as values the functions sP, g, r , where
the distribution of P is IGDH(1n), the distribution of g is uniform over the set of
generators of Z*P , and the distribution of r is Un . The function ensemble SDH is
defined [Sn]n # N .
Note that in a subsequent work [46] we show a direct and efficient construction
of n-dimensional pseudo-random synthesizers based on the (stronger) decisional
version of the DH-assumption. This construction gives very efficient pseudo-random-
functions.
Theorem 8.2. If the DH-assumption (Assumption 8.1) holds, then SDH is a collec-
tion of I 2n [ I 1 pseudo-random synthesizers.
Proof. It is obvious that SDH=[Sn]n # N is efficiently computable. Assume that
SDH is not a collection of pseudo-random synthesizers. Then there exists a polyno-
mial m( } ) such that the ensemble E=[En] is not pseudo-random, where
En=CSn (X, Y) for X and Y that are independently drawn from (Un)
m(n). Therefore,
there exists an efficient next-bit prediction test, T, and a polynomial q( } ) such that
for infinitely many n’s it holds that
Given a prefix of En of uniformly chosen length, T succeeds to predict the
next bit with probability greater than 12+1q(n).
We now show how to use T in order to define an efficient algorithm A such that
for infinitely many n’s
Pr[A(P, g, ga, gb, r)= gab x r]>
1
2
+
1
q(n)
,
where the distribution of P, g, a, and b is as in the DH-assumption and r is drawn
from Un . By Theorem 8.1, this means that gab can also be efficiently computed
which contradicts the DH-assumption and completes the proof of the lemma.
In the definition of A we use this fact that in order to compute gxy=(gx) y=
(g y)x it is enough to either know gx and y or g y and x (i.e., it is not required to
know both x and y). This enables A to define a matrix which is distributed accord-
ing to En such that one of its entries is gab x r (the value A tries to guess) and all
other entries can be computed by A. It is now possible for A to guess gab x r by
invoking T on the appropriate prefix of this matrix.
In more details, on input (P, g, ga, gb, r) the algorithm A is defined as
1. Uniformly choose 1i, jm(n).
2. Define X=[x1 , ..., xm(n)] and Y=[ y1 , ..., ym(n)] by setting xi=a, yj=b
and independently drawing all other values from Un .
3. Define B=(bu, v)m(n)u, v=1 to be CsP, g, r(X, Y). (Note that A knows all the
values of X and Y except xi and yj . Therefore, A can compute all the entries of B
except bi, j= gab x r.)
4. Invoke T and feed it with all the entries of B up to bi, j (i.e., the first i&1
rows and the first j&1 entries of the ith row).
5. Output T’s prediction of bi, j .
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It is obvious that A is efficient. Furthermore, since the distribution of B is
exactly En , it is immediate that for infinitely many n’s Pr[A(P, g, ga, gb, r)=
gab x r]> 12+1q(n), where the distribution of P, g, a, b, and r is as above. This
contradicts the DH-assumption and proves the lemma. K
Corollary 8.3. If the DH-assumption (Assumption 8.1) holds, then there exist
pseudo-random functions that are computable in NC2 (given a sequential precomputa-
tion which is part of the key-generating algorithm).
Proof. By Theorem 8.2, given that the DH-assumption holds, SDH is a collec-
tion of pseudo-random synthesizers. If the key-generating algorithm precomputes
g2 i mod P for 1in, then the functions of SDH can be evaluated in NC1. This
precomputation reduces any modular exponentiation (with g as the base) to an
iterated multiplication and an additional modular reduction (see also the discussion
at the beginning of this section). By Corollary 5.2, there exist pseudo-random func-
tions in NC2 (the key-generating algorithm in both cases is sequential). K
Remark 8.1. Assume that IGDH(1n) has a single possible value, P, for every n.
Then SDH can be transformed into a synthesizer rather than a collection of syn-
thesizers. In this case, the key-generating algorithm of the pseudo-random functions
we get is in ‘‘nonuniform’’ NC.
8.3. Composite DiffieHellman Assumption and Factoring
The collection of pseudo-random synthesizers, SDH , is at least as secure as the
DH-assumption modulo a prime. As mentioned above, the DH-assumption in any
other group gives a corresponding construction of pseudo-random synthesizers with
practically the same proof of security. We now consider the DH-assumption modulo
a Blum integer (composite DH-assumption). McCurley [44] and Shmuely [58]
have shown that the composite DH-assumption is implied by the assumption that
factoring Blum integers is hard (see also [10] for definitions and proof that are
more consistent with our setting). We therefore get a simple construction of pseudo-
random synthesizers which is at least as secure as factoring. In the sequel we give
the relevant definitions and claims. We omit the proofs (since they are practically
the same as in Section 8.2).
To formalize the composite DH-assumption we let this composite be generated
by some polynomial-time algorithm IGF . We restrict the output of IGF to the set
of Blum integers. This restriction is quite standard and it is meant to simplify the
reduction of the composite DH-assumption to factoring.
Definition 8.3 (IGF). The factoring instance generator, IGF , is a probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm such that on input 1n its output, N, is distributed over
2n-bit integers, where N=P } Q for two n-bit primes, P and Q, such that P#Q#
3 mod 4 (such an integer is known as a Blum integer).
We note that the most natural distribution of IGF(1
n) is the uniform distribution
over 2n-bit Blum integers. Furthermore, it is essential that IGF(1n) would have
many possible values since otherwise factoring would be nonuniformly easy (in this
362 NAOR AND REINGOLD
respect it is very different from the case of the DiffieHellman instance generator,
IGDH).
All exponentiations in the rest of this subsection are in Z*N (the definition of N
will be clear by the context). To simplify the notations, we omit the expression
‘‘mod N’’ from now on. We can now define both the composite DH-assumption
and the assumption that factoring Blum integers is hard (for the instance generator
given IGF).
Assumption 8.2 (Composite DiffieHellman). For every probabilistic polyno-
mial-time algorithm, A, for every polynomial, q( } ), and all sufficiently large n’s,
Pr[A(N, g, ga, gb)= gab]<
1
q(n)
,
where the distribution of N is IGF(1n), the distribution of g is uniform over the set
of quadratic residues in Z*N , and the distribution of (a, b) is (U2n)2.
Assumption 8.3 (Factoring). For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm,
A, for every polynomial, q( } ), and all sufficiently large n’s,
Pr[A(P } Q) # [P, Q]]<
1
q(n)
,
where the distribution of N=P } Q is IGF(1n).
We define a collection of I4n [ I1 pseudo-random synthesizers, SF (in analogy to
the definition of SDH).
Definition 8.4. For every 2n-bit Blum integer, N, every quadratic residue, g,
in Z*N , and every r # I 2n, define sN, g, r : I2n [ I 1 by
\x, y # I 2n, sN, g, r(x, y) =
def gxy x r.
Let Sn be the random variable that assumes as values the functions sN, g, r , where
the distribution of N is IGF(1n), the distribution of g is uniform over the set of
quadratic residues in Z*N , and the distribution of r is U2n . The function ensemble
SDH is defined [Sn]n # N .
In the same way Theorem 8.2 was proven we get
Theorem 8.4. If the composite DH-assumption (Assumption 8.2) holds, then SF
is a collection of I4n [ I 1 pseudo-random synthesizers.
Since the composite DH-assumption (Assumption 8.2) is implied by the factoring
assumption (Assumption 8.3) we get
Corollary 8.5 (of Theorem 8.4 and of [10, 44, 58]). If factoring Blum integers
is hard (Assumption 8.3), then SF is a collection of I4n [ I 1 pseudo-random synthesizers.
Finally, we can conclude
363SYNTHESIZERS AND PSEUDO-RANDOM FUNCTIONS
Corollary 8.6. If factoring Blum integers is hard (Assumption 8.3), then there
exist pseudo-random functions that are computable in NC2 (given a sequential
precomputation which is part of the key-generating algorithm).
8.4. The RSA Assumption
We now define two collections of pseudo-random synthesizers under the assump-
tion that the RSA-permutations of Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [55] are indeed
one-way (i.e., under the assumption that it is hard to extract roots modulo a com-
posite). This assumption is not weaker than the factoring assumption. However, the
constructions based on RSA might have other advantages. For example, the second
RSA construction gives pseudo-random synthesizers with linear output length
under the assumption that 0(n) least-significant bits are simultaneously hard for
RSA. Another reason to include these constructions is that they use several interest-
ing techniques that might be useful elsewhere (e.g., the multiple role played by the
subset product function).
As was the case with the previous assumptions, we keep the definition of the RSA
assumption general by using some polynomial-time instance generator, IGRSA .
Definition 8.5 (IGRSA). The RSA instance generator, IGRSA , is a probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm such that on input 1n its output is distributed over pairs
(N, e). Where N=P } Q is a 2n-bit integer, P and Q are two n-bit primes and
e # Z*.(N) (i.e., e is relatively prime to the order of Z*N which is denoted by .(N)).
All exponentiations in the rest of this subsection are in Z*N (the definition of N
will be clear by the context). To simplify the notations, we omit the expression
‘‘mod N’’ from now on. We can now define the RSA-assumption (for the instance
generator given IGRSA).
Assumption 8.4 (RSA [55]). For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm,
A, for every polynomial, q( } ), and all sufficiently large n’s,
Pr[A(N, e, me)=m]<
1
q(n)
,
where the distribution of (N, e) is IGRSA(1n) and m is uniformly distributed in Z*N .
The RSA-assumption gives a collection of trapdoor one-way permutations: the
public key is (N, e) , the function fN, e is defined by fN, e(m)=me, and the trapdoor-
key is (N, e, d) , where d=e&1 mod Z*.(N) (which enables efficient inversion by the
formula m=(me)d). In Section 7 we showed a general construction of pseudo-random
synthesizers out of trapdoor one-way permutations. However, a straightforward
application of this construction to the RSA collection gives very inefficient syn-
thesizers. In the following few paragraphs we describe this construction, the reasons
it is inefficient, and some of the ideas and tools that allow us to get more efficient
synthesizers (which are also computable in NC1).
Applying the construction of Section 7 to the RSA collection (using the Goldreich
Levin [28] hard-core predicate) gives the following collection of synthesizers: The
key of each synthesizer is a uniformly distributed string r; for every x, y # In,
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sr(x, y) =
def md x r, where x samples the trapdoor-key (N, e, d) and y samples a
uniformly chosen element m # Z*N . The most obvious drawback of this definition is
that computing the value sr(x, y) consists of sampling an RSA trapdoor-key. In
particular, computing sr(x, y) consists of sampling a Blum integer, N. This (rather
heavy) operation might be acceptable as part of the key-generating algorithm of the
pseudo-random synthesizers (or functions), but it is extremely undesirable as part
of their evaluation.
In the direct constructions of pseudo-random synthesizers based on RSA, we
manage to ‘‘push’’ the composite N into the key of the synthesizers (thus overcom-
ing the drawback described in the previous paragraph). Nevertheless, we are still
left with the following problem: Computing md in NC 1 requires precomputation
that depends on m. To enable this precomputation, it seems that m needs to be part
of the key as well. However, in the construction which is described above, m
depends on the input and is uniformly distributed for a random input. In order to
overcome this problem, we show a method of sampling m almost uniformly at
random in a way that facilitates the necessary preprocessing. This method uses the
subset product functions. We first define these functions and then describe the way
they are used in our context.
Definition 8.6. Let G be a finite group and let y=[ y1 , ..., yn] be an n-tuple of
elements in G. For any n-bit string, x=x1 } } } xn , define the subset product SPG, y(x)
to be the product in G of the elements yi such that x i=1.
The following lemma was shown by Impagliazzo and Naor [34] and is based on
the leftover hash lemma of [31, 35].
Lemma 8.7 ([34]). Let G be a finite group, n>c log |G| and c>1. Then for all
but an exponentially small fraction of the choices of y # (G)n, the distribution
SPG, y(Un) is statistically indistinguishable within an exponentially small amount from
the uniform distribution over G.
Let N be a 2n-bit integer. Lemma 8.7 gives a way of defining a collection of func-
tions [ fk : I3n [ Z*N]k which solves the problem of sampling an almost uniformly
distributed element m # Z*N for which md can be computed in NC1. This collection
is [ fg ]g =[SPZ*N , g]g , where g=[g1 , ..., g3n] is a sequence of 3n elements in Z*N .
The functions [ fg ]g have the following properties:
1. For almost all choices of the key g we have that fg (U3n) is almost
uniformly distributed in Z*N .
2. Following preprocessing that depends only on the key, g, each value
( fg (x)) y can be computed in NC 1. The values that need to be precomputed are g2 ji ,
where 1i3n and 0 j the length of y. With these values the computation of
( fg (x)) y is reduced to a single iterated multiplication (and an additional modular
reduction).
8.4.1. The first RSA construction. For our first RSA construction we need to
assume that it is hard to extract the eth root modulo a composite when e is a large
prime. To formalize this, we assume that for every possible value (N, e) of IGRSA(1n)
we have that e is a 2n-bit prime (which in particular means that e # Z*.(N)). Based on
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this version of the RSA-assumption we define a collection of I6n [ I1 pseudo-random
synthesizers, SRSA 1 .
Definition 8.7. Let N be a 2n-bit integer, let g=[g1 , ..., g3n] be a sequence of
3n elements in Z*N , and let r be a 2n-bit string. Define the function sN, g, r : I 6n [ I 1
by
\x, y # I 3n, sN, g, r(x, y) =
def
(gx) y x r,
where gx=SPZ*N , g(x). Let Sn to be the random variable that assumes as values the
functions sN, g, r , where the distribution of N is induced by IGRSA(1n) and g and r
are uniformly distributed in their range. The function ensemble SRSA 1 is defined
[Sn]n # N .
Note that the only reason we let y be a 3n-bit number (instead of a 2n-bit
number) is to make both inputs of sN, g, r be of the same length (which not really
necessary for our constructions).
Theorem 8.8. If the RSA-assumption (Assumption 8.4) holds when for every
possible value (N, e) of IGRSA(1n), we have that e is a 2n-bit prime. Then SRSA 1 is
a collection of I6n [ I 1 pseudo-random synthesizers.
Proof. It is obvious that SRSA 1=[Sn]n # N is efficiently computable. Assume
that SRSA 1 is not a collection of pseudo-random synthesizers. Then there exists a
polynomial m( } ) such that the ensemble E=[En] is not pseudo-random, where
En=CSn(X, Y) for X and Y that are independently drawn from (U3n)
m(n). Therefore,
there exists an efficient next-bit prediction test, T, and a polynomial, q( } ), such
that for infinitely many n’s it holds:
Given a prefix of En of uniformly chosen length, T succeeds to predict the
next bit with probability greater than 12+1q(n).
We now show how to use T in order to define an efficient algorithm A such that
for infinitely many n’s,
Pr[A(N, e, me, z, r)=mz x r]>
1
2
+
1
2q(n)
,
where the distribution of N, e, and m is as in the RSA-assumption (with the restric-
tion that e is a 2n-bit prime), r is drawn from U2n , and z is uniformly distributed
over the set of 3n-bit integers that are relatively prime to e. By Theorem 8.1, this
means that mz can also be efficiently computed. Following Shamir [56], we note
that, given any z such that gcd(e, z)=1 and given mz, it is easy to compute m. The
reason is that if gcd(e, z)=1 then m can be computed by the formula m=(me)a
(mz)b, where a, b # Z satisfy that ae+bz=1 (and can be efficiently computed as
well). Thus, the existence of such an algorithm A contradicts the RSA-assumption
and completes the proof of the lemma.
The algorithm A defines a matrix B which is almost identically distributed as En .
One of the entries of B is mz x r (the value A tries to guess) and all other entries
can be computed by A. It is now possible for A to guess mz x r by invoking T
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on the appropriate prefix of this matrix. In more detail, on input (N, e, me, z, r)
the algorithm A is defined as follows:
1. Uniformly choose 1i, jm(n).
2. Define the values [h1 , ..., hm(n)] and [d1 , ..., dm(n)] by setting hi=m, uniformly
drawing all other hu ’s from Z*N , setting dj=z } e&1 mod .(N) and drawing all other dv ’s
from U3n .
3. Define B=(bu, v)m(n)u, v=1 by setting bu, v=(((hu)
e)dv) x r. (Note that A can
compute any entry bu, v except bi, j=mz x r. The reason is that if v{ j then A
knows both dv and (hu)e and if u{i then A can compute bu, j=(((hu)e)z } e
&1
) x r=
(hu)z x r since it knows both hu and z.)
4. Invoke T and feed it with all the entries of B up to bi, j (i.e., the first i&1
rows and the first j&1 entries of the ith row).
5. Output T’s prediction of bi, j .
It is obvious that A is efficient. In order to complete the proof, we need to show
that if (N, e, me, z, r) are distributed as above, then B and En are of exponentially
small statistical distance. This would imply that (for infinitely many n’s) if we feed
T with the bits of B up to bi, j it predicts bi, j=mz x r with probability greater
than, say, 12+12q(n). As argued above, this would contradict the RSA-assumption
and would complete the proof.
To see that B and En are indeed statistically close, notice:
v Since e # Z*.(N) and \1um(n) the value mu is uniformly distributed in
Z*N , we have that \1um(n) the value (mu)e is also uniformly distributed in Z*N .
By Lemma 8.7, we therefore have that the distribution of [(mu)e]1um(n) is
statistically close to the distribution of [gxu=SPZ*N , g(xu)]1um(n) for uniformly
distributed values [x1 , ..., xm(n)] # (I 3n)m(n) and g=[g1 , ..., g3n] # (Z*N)3n.
v For z that is chosen from U3n the distribution of z } e&1 mod .(N) and
U3n mod .(N) are statistically close. Since e is a large prime, even given the restric-
tion that z is relatively prime to e these distributions are statistically close.
Given these two observations it is easy to verify that B and En are, indeed, of
exponentially small statistical distance. K
Claim 8.1. The functions in SRSA 1 can be evaluated in NC 1 (given a sequential
precomputation which is part of the key-generating algorithm).
Proof. Given that the key-generating algorithm precomputes (gi)2
j
for 1i,
j3n, the evaluation of functions in SRSA 1 is reduced to an iterated multiplication
and an additional modular reduction. K
8.4.2. The second RSA construction. The security of SRSA 1 depends on the
assumption that it is hard to extract the eth root modulo a composite, where e is
a large prime. Here, we define another collection of synthesizers under the assump-
tion that it is hard to extract the eth root modulo a composite, N, without any
restriction on the distribution of e # Z*.(N) . However, we introduce a new restriction
on the possible values of the composite N.
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Definition 8.8. Let Gn be the set of 2n-bit integers N=P } Q such that P and
Q are two n-bit primes and .(N) has no odd factor smaller than n2.
It is easy to verify that if N # Gn then a sequence of 3n uniformly chosen odd
values, d=[d1 , ..., d3n] # ZN , have a constant probability to be in (Z*.(N))3n. By
Lemma 8.7, given such a sequence, it is easy to almost uniformly sample any poly-
nomial number of values in Z*.(N) even without knowledge of .(N). This can be done
by using the subset product function5 SPZ*.(N) , d . Notice that here the subset product
function serves an additional role to the one already described above.
Sieve theory shows that Gn is not too sparse. For example, denote by B(x) the
number of primes p smaller than x such that ( p&1)2 is the product of two primes,
each of which is larger than p14. Then there exists a positive constant c such that
B(x)(cxlog2 x). See [52] for several results of this sort (which are more than
sufficient for our purpose). As a result we get: (a) If the RSA-assumption holds for
a uniformly distributed value of N, then it also holds under the restriction N # Gn .
(b) The uniform distribution over Gn can be efficiently sampled (using Bach’s algo-
rithm [5]). Given (a) and (b) it seems that this restriction is rather reasonable.
Based on the RSA-assumption with the restriction that N # Gn , we define a
collection of I 6n [ I 1 pseudo-random synthesizers, SRSA 2 . In the definition of
SRSA 2 , we use the least-significant bit (LSB), instead of the GoldreichLevin hard-
core bit. Alexi et al. [2] showed that LSB is a hard-core bit for RSA. Fischlin and
Schnorr [22] have recently provided a stronger reduction for this bit.
Definition 8.9. Let N be a 2n-bit integer, let g=[g1 , ..., g3n] be a sequence of
3n elements in Z*N , and let d=[d1 , ..., d3n] be a sequence of 3n elements in Z*.(N) .
Define the function sN, g, d : I 6n [ I 1 by
\x, y # I 3n, sN, g, d(x, y) =
def LSB((gx)dy),
where gx=SPZ*N , g(x) and dy=SPZ*.(N) , d( y). Let Sn be the random variable that
assumes as values the functions sN, g, d , where the distribution of N is induced by
IGRSA(1
n) and g and d are uniformly distributed in their range. The function ensemble
SRSA 2 is defined to be [Sn]n # N .
Theorem 8.9. If the RSA-assumption (Assumption 8.4) holds when for every
possible value (N, e) of IGRSA(1n), we have that N # Gn . Then SRSA 2 is a collection
of I 6n [ I 1 pseudo-random synthesizers.
Proof. It is obvious that SRSA 2=[Sn]n # N is efficiently computable. Assume
that SRSA 2 is not a collection of pseudo-random synthesizers. Then there exists a
polynomial m( } ) such that the ensemble E=[En] is not pseudo-random, where
En=CSn (X, Y) for X and Y that are independently drawn from (U3n)
m(n). There-
fore, there exists an efficient next-bit prediction test, T and a polynomial q( } ) such
that for infinitely many n’s it holds:
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5 Actually, without knowledge of .(N), we cannot really compute SPZ*.(N) , d . However, for every input
x, we can still compute y such that SPZ*.(N) , d(x)= y mod .(N). Such a value y would be just as good
as SPZ*.(N) , d(x) for our proof.
Given a prefix of En of uniformly chosen length, T succeeds to predict the
next bit with probability greater than 12+1q(n).
We now show how to use T in order to define an efficient algorithm A such that
for infinitely many n’s,
Pr[A(N, e, me)=LSB(m)]>
1
2
+
1
2q(n)
,
where the distribution of N, e, and m is as in the RSA-assumption (with the restric-
tion that N # Gn). By [2], this contradicts the RSA-assumption and completes the
proof of the lemma.
The basic idea in the definition of the algorithm A is similar to the proof of
Theorem 8.8; the algorithm A defines a matrix B which is almost identically distri-
buted as En . One of the entries of B is LSB(m) (the value A tries to guess) and
all other entries can be computed by A. It is now possible for A to guess LSB(m)
by invoking T on the appropriate prefix of this matrix. In more details, on input
(N, e, me) as above, the algorithm A is defined as
1. Uniformly choose 1i, jm(n).
2. Define e^ to be e } d, where d is almost uniformly distributed in Z*.(N) (such
a value d can be sampled because N # Gn). (Note that e^ is almost uniformly distri-
buted in Z*.(N) .)
3. Define the values [h1 , ..., hm(n)] and [d1 , ..., dm(n)] by setting hi=m,
uniformly drawing all other hu ’s from Z*N , setting dj=e^&1 mod .(N) and sampling
all other dv ’s almost uniformly from Z*.(N) .
4. Define B=(bu, v)m(n)u, v=1 by setting bu, v=LSB(((hu)
e^)dv). (Note that A can
compute any entry bu, v except bi, j=LSB(m). The reason is that if v{ j then A
knows both dv and (hu) e^ and if u{i then A can compute bu, j=LSB(((hu) e^) e^
&1
)=
LSB((hu)) since it knows hu .)
5. Invoke T and feed it with all the entries of B up to bi, j (i.e., the first i&1
rows and the first j&1 entries of the ith row).
6. Output T’s prediction of bi, j .
It is obvious that A is efficient. It is also easy to verify that if (N, e, me) is distri-
buted as above; then B and En are of exponentially small statistical distance. There-
fore, for infinitely many n’s if we feed T with the bits of B up to bi, j it predicts
bi, j=LSB(m) with probability greater than, say, 12+12q(n). As argued above, this
contradicts the RSA-assumption and completes the proof of the lemma. K
Claim 8.2. The functions in SRSA 2 can be evaluated in NC 1 (given a sequential
precomputation which is part of the key-generating algorithm).
Proof. Given that the key-generating algorithm precomputes (gi)2
j
for 1i,
j3n, the evaluation of functions in SRSA 2 is reduced to two iterated multiplication
and two modular reductions. K
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Remark 8.2. Since Alexi et al. [2] showed that the log n least-significant bits
are simultaneously hard for RSA we can adjust the functions in SRSA 2 to output
log n bits. If we make a stronger assumption, that 0(n) bits are simultaneously hard
for RSA, we get a direct construction of pseudo-random synthesizers with linear
output size. Although the stronger assumption is not known to be equivalent to the
RSA-assumption it is still quite standard.
9. PSEUDO-RANDOMNESS AND LEARNING-THEORY
9.1. Synthesizers Based on Hard-to-Learn Problems
The ‘‘traditional’’ connection between cryptography and learning theory is using
cryptographic assumptions to deduce computational nonlearnability results. Blum,
Furst, Kearns, and Lipton [13] have suggested that the other direction is interest-
ing as well. They have shown how to construct several cryptographic primitives out
of hard-to-learn functions, in a way that preserves the degree of parallelism of the
functions. A major motivation for presenting such constructions is the simplicity of
function classes that are believed to be hard for efficient learning.
We show that, under the definitions of [13], pseudo-random synthesizers can
easily be constructed from distributions of functions that are hard to learn. Thus
(by the constructions shown in this paper), two additional cryptographic primitives
can be constructed in parallel out of hard-to-learn functions: (1) pseudo-random
generators with large expansion ratio (without assuming, as in [13], that the func-
tions are hard to learn with membership queries); (2) pseudo-random functions.
There is a difference between standard learning-theory definitions and standard
cryptographic definitions. Loosely speaking, a collection of concepts is hard to
learn if for every efficient algorithm there exists a distribution over the concepts that
is hard to learn for this specific algorithm. In cryptographic settings the order of
quantifiers is reversed; the hard distribution should be hard for every efficient algo-
rithm. In order for hard-to-learn problems to be useful in cryptographic settings an
average-case learning model is introduced in [13].
Informally describing one of the definitions in [13], we can say that a distribu-
tion ensemble of functions, F=[Fn] # N , is not weakly predictable on the average
with respect to a distribution D on the inputs, if the following holds: There is no
efficient algorithm that can predict f (x~ ) with probability 12+1poly(n), given x~ and
a polynomial sequence [(xi , f (xi))], where f is distributed according to Fn and all
the inputs are independently distributed according to D.
It is easy to verify that a distribution ensemble of functions, F, is not weakly
predictable on the average with respect to the uniform distribution if and only if it
is a collection of weak pseudo-random functions. Thus, by Lemma 7.1, such a
distribution defines a pseudo-random synthesizer S, where S(x, y) is simply
fIy (1n)(x) (recall that fIy (1n) denotes the function that is sampled from Fn using y as
random bits). Using S we can construct pseudo-random generators and pseudo-
random functions. Moreover, by Lemma 3.1, the pseudo-random generator we
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construct may have a large expansion ratio (n1&= for every =>0). The pseudo-
random generator constructed in [13] under the same assumption has expansion
ratio bounded by 1+1n.
9.1.1. A concrete hard-to-learn problem. Consider the following distribution on
functions with parameters k and n. Each function is defined by two uniformly distri-
buted, disjoint sets A, B/[1, ..., n], each of size k. Given an n-bit input, the output
of the function is the exclusive-or of two values: the parity of the bits indexed by
A and the majority of the bits indexed by B. In [13], it is estimated that these func-
tions (for k=log n) cannot be weakly predictable without using ‘‘profoundly’’ new
ideas. If indeed this distribution of functions is not weakly predictable on the
average (for any k), then it defines an extremely efficient synthesizer. Therefore,
using the constructions of this paper, we get efficient parallel pseudo-random
functions.
9.2. The Application of Pseudo-Random Functions to Learning Theory
As observed by Valiant [59], if a concept class contains pseudo-random functions,
then we can deduce a very strong unlearnability result for this class. Informally, it
means that there exists a distribution of concepts in this class that is hard for
every learning algorithm, for every ‘‘nontrivial’’ distribution on inputs, even when
membership queries are allowed. Since no parallel pseudo-random functions were
known before the current work, this observation could not have been applied
to NC.
Nevertheless, other techniques based on cryptographic assumptions were used in
[3, 37, 38] to show hardness results for NC 1 and additional classes. For example,
Kharitonov [38] used the fact that after preprocessing, a polynomial-length
pseudo-random bit-string (based on [11]) can be produced in NC1 (the length of
the string can stay undetermined at the preprocessing stage). The existence of
pseudo-random functions in NC might still be of interest to computational learning
theory because the result it implies is stronger than previous results. To briefly state
the difference, we note that the results of [3, 37] use a very specific distribution on
the inputs that is hard-to-learn and the results of [38] strongly rely on the order
of quantifiers in learning-theory models which was mentioned above (e.g., for any
given learning algorithm [38] shows a different hard concept which can still be
easily learned by an algorithm which has a somewhat larger running-time).
10. FURTHER RESEARCH
In Sections 79 we discussed the existence of pseudo-random synthesizers in NC.
Additional work should be done in this area. The most obvious question is what
are the general assumptions (in cryptography or in other fields) that imply the
existence of pseudo-random synthesizers in NC. In particular, whether there exist
parallel constructions of pseudo-random synthesizers out of pseudo-random gener-
ators or directly from one-way functions.
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It is also of interest to find parallel constructions of pseudo-random synthesizers
based on other concrete intractability assumptions. A task of practical importance
is to derive more efficient concrete constructions of pseudo-random synthesizers in
order to get efficient constructions of pseudo-random functions. As described in
Section 3.3, an important contribution to the efficiency of the pseudo-random func-
tions would be a direct construction of synthesizers with linear output length.
An extensive research field deals with pseudo-random generators that ‘‘fool’’
algorithms performing space-bounded computations. This kind of generators can be
constructed without any (unproven) assumptions; see [4, 47, 48, 5; 6] for definitions,
constructions, and applications. It is possible that the concept of pseudo-random
synthesizers and the idea of our construction can be applied to the ‘‘world’’ of
space-bounded computations. As a motivation remark, note that the construction
in [47] bears some resemblance to the GGM construction.
In some sense we can think of the inner product function as a pseudo-random
synthesizer for space bounded computation. Let IP(x, y) be the inner product of x
and y (mod 2) and let X and Y be random length-m sequences of n-bit strings. For
some constant 0<:<1 and s=:n it can be shown that CIP(X, Y) is a pseudo-
random generator for SPACE(s) with parameter ==2&0(s)m2 (when CIP(X, Y) is
given row by row). The only fact we use is that approximating IP is ‘‘hard’’ in the
communication complexity model (see [20, 60]).
One might also try to apply the concept of pseudo-random synthesizers for other
classes of algorithms. For example [1, 49] construct pseudo-random generators for
polynomial-size constant-depth circuits, and, in general, for any class for which
hard problems are known.
Our primary motivation for introducing pseudo-random synthesizers is the
parallel construction of pseudo-random functions The special characteristics of
pseudo-random synthesizers lead us to believe that other desired applications may
exist. For instance, pseudo-random synthesizers easily define a pseudo-random
generator with large output length and the ability to directly compute subsequences
of the output. This and the properties discussed in Section 6 suggests that pseudo-
random synthesizers may be useful for software implementations of pseudo-random
generators or functions. Another possible application of the idea of Construction 4.1
that should be examined is to convert encryption methods that are not immune to
chosen plain-text attacks into ones that are immune.
As mentioned in the Introduction, in a subsequent work [46] we describe
constructions of pseudo-random functions (and other cryptographic primitives)
based on several number-theoretic assumptions. These functions can be computed
in NC1 (in fact, even in TC 0) and are very efficient. We note that [46] is motivated
by the current work and that it can be described as a direct and efficient construc-
tion of n-dimensional pseudo-random synthesizers (see Section 4). The question
that arises is whether there exist other such constructions of n-dimensional pseudo-
random synthesizers.
An alternative direction for constructing parallel pseudo-random functions is to
try and generalize the philosophy behind the data encryption standard (DES) while
maintaining its apparent efficiency. Some interesting ideas and results on the
generalization of DES can be found in Cleve’s work [17, 18].
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